quote: ❗️Worth reading this @FT piece, which reinforces a point many of us have been making since the #Hormuz crisis began, that not all Mideast Gulf producers are absorbing this shock equally. 🧵 1/ #Qatar & #Kuwait were always among the most vulnerable because, unlike #SaudiArabia and the #UAE, they have virtually no meaningful alternative export routes outside Hormuz. We are now seeing the economic consequences. 2/ Qatar has reportedly cut some government department budgets by as much as 30pc and overseas aid funding by ~85pc, while the IMF expects its economy to contract 8.6pc this year. Lost energy revenues are estimated at $1.5bn-$2bn per week for Qatar and Kuwait, as per @GoldmanSachs. 3/ But there is a wider geopolitical point worth highlighting too. Iran may be betting, at least partly, on the very real differences and trust deficits among Arab Gulf states. Yet there is a point at which that calculation begins producing the opposite result. 4/ The #GCC countries do not always see eye to eye. Yes, we know that. But none has an interest in seeing the economic or national security of another fundamentally threatened. 5/ The longer Hormuz remains effectively closed and the more Gulf infrastructure and shipping come under attack, the stronger the incentive becomes for these countries to treat their vulnerabilities as increasingly collective rather than individual. That is already starting to happen, as per senior gulf officials I’ve spoken to. 6/ Iranian pressure intended to exploit differences within the #GCC will eventually accelerate security coordination, shared infrastructure and a common push to reduce Iran’s leverage over regional trade and energy flows. This is becoming existential. #oott | Qatar cuts state spending at home and abroad as war shrinks economy https://ft.trib.al/wptEeiW

quote: ❗️Worth reading this @FT piece, which reinforces a point many of us have been making since the #Hormuz crisis began, that not all Mideast Gulf producers are absorbing this shock equally. 🧵 1/ #Qatar & #Kuwait were always among the most vulnerable because, unlike #SaudiArabia and the #UAE, they have virtually no meaningful alternative export routes outside Hormuz. We are now seeing the economic consequences. 2/ Qatar has reportedly cut some government department budgets by as much as 30pc and overseas aid funding by ~85pc, while the IMF expects its economy to contract 8.6pc this year. Lost energy revenues are estimated at $1.5bn-$2bn per week for Qatar and Kuwait, as per @GoldmanSachs. 3/ But there is a wider geopolitical point worth highlighting too. Iran may be betting, at least partly, on the very real differences and trust deficits among Arab Gulf states. Yet there is a point at which that calculation begins producing the opposite result. 4/ The #GCC countries do not always see eye to eye. Yes, we know that. But none has an interest in seeing the economic or national security of another fundamentally threatened. 5/ The longer Hormuz remains effectively closed and the more Gulf infrastructure and shipping come under attack, the stronger the incentive becomes for these countries to treat their vulnerabilities as increasingly collective rather than individual. That is already starting to happen, as per senior gulf officials I’ve spoken to. 6/ Iranian pressure intended to exploit differences within the #GCC will eventually accelerate security coordination, shared infrastructure and a common push to reduce Iran’s leverage over regional trade and energy flows. This is becoming existential. #oott | Qatar cuts state spending at home and abroad as war shrinks economy https://ft.trib.al/wptEeiW

Source:https://x.com/staunovo/status/2091126132271612313