Significant statements from Tehran today point to a growing recognition among the Iranian leadership of the severity of the economic situation and the erosion of Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in light of U.S. military gains in opening a corridor through the strait.

President Pezeshkian stressed that the government does not deny the shortages and that it would be better to end the war now, while Iran is in a position of strength and dignity and the entire world recognizes its victory. Majles Speaker Qalibaf stated that no matter how much military power Iran possesses, if the people are hungry, it will not be able to endure.

Nevertheless, at this stage, there is still no indication that Iran is prepared to show flexibility and return to the MOU without preconditions, apart from its original demand for the lifting of the naval blockade and some sanctions relief. Tehran still appears to assess that, despite recent developments, it retains the ability to inflict significantly greater damage on the global economy and its Gulf neighbors, and that the price of a possible escalation (even to the point of renewed hostilities) is lower than the cost of yielding to U.S. demands and reopening Hormuz unconditionally in return for a temporary ceasefire that does not guarantee an end to the war and that, from Tehran’s perspective, could be terminated after the November midterm elections.

Moreover, the ambiguous messages coming from the United States, including Treasury Secretary Bessent’s statement yesterday, in which he once again spoke about the collapse of the Iranian regime, could reinforce opposition in Tehran to any possible agreement. It is not clear that Tehran understands what the United States is prepared to offer Iran at this stage, particularly when President Trump himself appears confident that economic pressure can achieve what military pressure failed to accomplish.

The bottom line, therefore, is that even if there is a growing recognition in Tehran that the current situation is not working in Iran’s favor, it is far from certain that this will be enough to build the necessary consensus—including among Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rezaei, and more importantly Mojtaba Khamenei—to allow a change of course.

Significant statements from Tehran today point to a growing recognition among the Iranian leadership of the severity of the economic situation and the erosion of Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in light of U.S. military gains in opening a corridor through the strait.

President Pezeshkian stressed that the government does not deny the shortages and that it would be better to end the war now, while Iran is in a position of strength and dignity and the entire world recognizes its victory. Majles Speaker Qalibaf stated that no matter how much military power Iran possesses, if the people are hungry, it will not be able to endure.

Nevertheless, at this stage, there is still no indication that Iran is prepared to show flexibility and return to the MOU without preconditions, apart from its original demand for the lifting of the naval blockade and some sanctions relief. Tehran still appears to assess that, despite recent developments, it retains the ability to inflict significantly greater damage on the global economy and its Gulf neighbors, and that the price of a possible escalation (even to the point of renewed hostilities) is lower than the cost of yielding to U.S. demands and reopening Hormuz unconditionally in return for a temporary ceasefire that does not guarantee an end to the war and that, from Tehran’s perspective, could be terminated after the November midterm elections.

Moreover, the ambiguous messages coming from the United States, including Treasury Secretary Bessent’s statement yesterday, in which he once again spoke about the collapse of the Iranian regime, could reinforce opposition in Tehran to any possible agreement. It is not clear that Tehran understands what the United States is prepared to offer Iran at this stage, particularly when President Trump himself appears confident that economic pressure can achieve what military pressure failed to accomplish.

The bottom line, therefore, is that even if there is a growing recognition in Tehran that the current situation is not working in Iran’s favor, it is far from certain that this will be enough to build the necessary consensus—including among Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rezaei, and more importantly Mojtaba Khamenei—to allow a change of course.

Source:https://twitter.com/laurnorman/status/2090800388890849320