quote: I understand the desire to find a military option that forces Iran back to the negotiating table on terms favorable to the United States. The problem is that a major campaign against Iran’s energy infrastructure is unlikely to produce that outcome. A serious strike on Iranian energy facilities would almost certainly trigger a much broader Iranian response against energy and other critical infrastructure across the Gulf. Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis would also likely join the escalation. Gulf states, knowing that they would bear much of the immediate cost, would have strong reasons to oppose such a campaign. There is also a political risk inside Iran. Once ordinary Iranians conclude that the objective is no longer to pressure the Islamic Republic but to inflict massive damage on Iran itself, the regime gains an opportunity to rally the country around the flag. Many Iranians who despise the Islamic Republic may still oppose a war they perceive as targeting their country and their livelihoods. So, Would Iran suffer? Absolutely. Would ordinary Iranians suffer? Significantly. Would Tehran retaliate and attempt to impose major economic costs on the Gulf and the global economy? Almost certainly. Would such a campaign guarantee the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz? No. Would it force the Islamic Republic to surrender its positions on issues it considers fundamental to Iran’s security and survival? That is far more doubtful. This is the distinction Washington needs to keep in mind: the ability to inflict tremendous damage on Iran is not the same as the ability to compel Iranian capitulation. A campaign against Iran’s energy infrastructure could leave Iran substantially poorer and weaker while simultaneously producing a wider regional war, severe disruption to the global economy, greater suffering for Iranian civilians, and potentially even stronger domestic support for the regime. Military power can impose extraordinary costs. The harder question is whether those costs produce the political concessions you actually want. In this case, there is very little reason to assume they will. Iran is far from invincible. That is not the question. The real question is whether the United States and its regional partners are prepared to pay the enormous costs of a prolonged and escalating war with Tehran without any assurance that those costs will fundamentally change Iran’s negotiating position. Before escalating, Washington needs to answer a much harder question: not whether Iran can be hurt, it clearly can, but what level of military, economic, and regional disruption the United States is willing to absorb if Tehran chooses escalation over capitulation. And there is every reason to believe that, on issues the Iranian leadership considers existential, it may do exactly that. #iran | Israel’s Channel 13 reports that CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper is pushing for renewed U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, including oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure. He reportedly told senior IDF officials that such attacks could force Iran to "change its position."

quote: I understand the desire to find a military option that forces Iran back to the negotiating table on terms favorable to the United States. The problem is that a major campaign against Iran’s energy infrastructure is unlikely to produce that outcome. A serious strike on Iranian energy facilities would almost certainly trigger a much broader Iranian response against energy and other critical infrastructure across the Gulf. Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis would also likely join the escalation. Gulf states, knowing that they would bear much of the immediate cost, would have strong reasons to oppose such a campaign. There is also a political risk inside Iran. Once ordinary Iranians conclude that the objective is no longer to pressure the Islamic Republic but to inflict massive damage on Iran itself, the regime gains an opportunity to rally the country around the flag. Many Iranians who despise the Islamic Republic may still oppose a war they perceive as targeting their country and their livelihoods. So, Would Iran suffer? Absolutely. Would ordinary Iranians suffer? Significantly. Would Tehran retaliate and attempt to impose major economic costs on the Gulf and the global economy? Almost certainly. Would such a campaign guarantee the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz? No. Would it force the Islamic Republic to surrender its positions on issues it considers fundamental to Iran’s security and survival? That is far more doubtful. This is the distinction Washington needs to keep in mind: the ability to inflict tremendous damage on Iran is not the same as the ability to compel Iranian capitulation. A campaign against Iran’s energy infrastructure could leave Iran substantially poorer and weaker while simultaneously producing a wider regional war, severe disruption to the global economy, greater suffering for Iranian civilians, and potentially even stronger domestic support for the regime. Military power can impose extraordinary costs. The harder question is whether those costs produce the political concessions you actually want. In this case, there is very little reason to assume they will. Iran is far from invincible. That is not the question. The real question is whether the United States and its regional partners are prepared to pay the enormous costs of a prolonged and escalating war with Tehran without any assurance that those costs will fundamentally change Iran’s negotiating position. Before escalating, Washington needs to answer a much harder question: not whether Iran can be hurt, it clearly can, but what level of military, economic, and regional disruption the United States is willing to absorb if Tehran chooses escalation over capitulation. And there is every reason to believe that, on issues the Iranian leadership considers existential, it may do exactly that. #iran | Israel’s Channel 13 reports that CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper is pushing for renewed U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, including oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure. He reportedly told senior IDF officials that such attacks could force Iran to "change its position."

Source:https://x.com/staunovo/status/2088132659075485852