There is no dispute over Iran’s deepening economic crisis, driven in part by the naval blockade and mounting economic pressure. The debate is over how to interpret it and its implications. This requires addressing four key issues:

A. The weight of economic considerations in Tehran’s decision-making. For some decision-makers, such as the president, the economy is clearly a central concern. For others, it is important but weighed alongside political, security, ideological, and other considerations.

B. How the economic situation is interpreted. What constitutes economic collapse? Can Iran cope with the economic consequences through the informal economy, sanctions-evasion mechanisms, and support for vulnerable segments of society? Moreover, the debate in Iran also considers the impact of the current situation on the global economy. Thus, even if Tehran recognizes the severity of its own economic situation, it may still assess that the other side will blink first because of the regional and global economic consequences.

C. How economic assessments affect Tehran’s decisions, and in which direction. The Iranian leadership may conclude that because the Trump administration cannot be trusted and could resume attacks after the November midterms even if the parties return to the MOU, there is no alternative but to endure the worsening economic situation. From Tehran’s perspective, the alternatives may pose an even greater threat to Iran’s national security, making the cost of compromise higher than the cost of continued economic hardship.

This does not mean that further economic deterioration could not eventually lead Tehran to become more flexible. But it could also prompt Iran to escalate in order to increase pressure on the other side. At this stage, however, there is no indication of greater flexibility in Tehran; if anything, the opposite is true.

D. How the economic crisis affects regime stability. Does a worsening crisis necessarily increase the potential for protest, or could it actually inhibit it, for example, as the erosion of the middle class leaves people increasingly focused on day-to-day survival?
More importantly, even if protests resume because of the economic crisis, are the conditions in place for political change, including millions in the streets, an organized coalition of different social groups, and fractures, divisions, and defections within the internal security forces? At this stage, there is no indication that such conditions exist.

There is no dispute over Iran’s deepening economic crisis, driven in part by the naval blockade and mounting economic pressure. The debate is over how to interpret it and its implications. This requires addressing four key issues:

A. The weight of economic considerations in Tehran’s decision-making. For some decision-makers, such as the president, the economy is clearly a central concern. For others, it is important but weighed alongside political, security, ideological, and other considerations.

B. How the economic situation is interpreted. What constitutes economic collapse? Can Iran cope with the economic consequences through the informal economy, sanctions-evasion mechanisms, and support for vulnerable segments of society? Moreover, the debate in Iran also considers the impact of the current situation on the global economy. Thus, even if Tehran recognizes the severity of its own economic situation, it may still assess that the other side will blink first because of the regional and global economic consequences.

C. How economic assessments affect Tehran’s decisions, and in which direction. The Iranian leadership may conclude that because the Trump administration cannot be trusted and could resume attacks after the November midterms even if the parties return to the MOU, there is no alternative but to endure the worsening economic situation. From Tehran’s perspective, the alternatives may pose an even greater threat to Iran’s national security, making the cost of compromise higher than the cost of continued economic hardship.

This does not mean that further economic deterioration could not eventually lead Tehran to become more flexible. But it could also prompt Iran to escalate in order to increase pressure on the other side. At this stage, however, there is no indication of greater flexibility in Tehran; if anything, the opposite is true.

D. How the economic crisis affects regime stability. Does a worsening crisis necessarily increase the potential for protest, or could it actually inhibit it, for example, as the erosion of the middle class leaves people increasingly focused on day-to-day survival?
More importantly, even if protests resume because of the economic crisis, are the conditions in place for political change, including millions in the streets, an organized coalition of different social groups, and fractures, divisions, and defections within the internal security forces? At this stage, there is no indication that such conditions exist.

Source:https://twitter.com/laurnorman/status/2087916202387460413