quote: The fundamental problem with the administration’s Iran strategy is that it has no clear endgame. Economic pressure can impose enormous costs on Tehran. But pressure is not a strategy unless there is a plausible mechanism for converting that pain into an acceptable and sustainable political outcome. Iran is unlikely to abandon its core positions simply because sanctions become more severe: control over access through the Strait of Hormuz, its ballistic missile program, and what it considers its right to enrich uranium. Tehran has also spent decades learning how to survive under sanctions. It can adapt, reroute trade, tolerate considerable economic pain and, above all, impose costs of its own. That leaves Washington with an uncomfortable question: What happens if Iran simply refuses to concede? Maintaining the current standoff is hardly cost-free. Hormuz remains severely restricted, U.S. forces must sustain an expensive military presence and blockade, American munitions inventories face additional pressure, and Tehran retains numerous ways to harass U.S. forces and threaten regional shipping. Meanwhile, the economic consequences of disrupted energy flows do not fall on Iran alone. More importantly, Tehran has little incentive to provide Washington with a comfortable, stable status quo. If Iranian leaders eventually conclude that their choice is between accepting American terms that they regard as capitulation and escalating the confrontation, there is every reason to believe they may choose escalation, or at least enough escalation to force Washington to reconsider its position. Avoiding a difficult decision today does not necessarily prevent escalation tomorrow. It may simply postpone the decision while raising its eventual cost. At some point, the administration will have to define what outcome it is actually prepared to accept and what concessions, if any, it is prepared to offer to obtain it. Otherwise Washington risks remaining stuck in an open-ended confrontation: too costly to sustain indefinitely, but without sufficient leverage to compel Iran to accept American terms. The current situation therefore looks less like a durable equilibrium than an intermission. Either diplomacy eventually produces a compromise both sides can live with, or the military confrontation is likely to intensify again. What is difficult to imagine is the present arrangement continuing unchanged for many months. Iran has both the incentive and the means to make sure that it does not. #iran | US President Donald Trump seems to be pursuing a “no war, no peace — just economic pressure” on Iran. Key for that strategy is to get enough oil out of the Strait of Hormuz in ‘dark shuttles’ so prices don’t spiral out of control before the economic pain on Tehran works. Key problem? Iran has demonstrated an incredible capacity to absorb financial pain in the past.

quote: The fundamental problem with the administration’s Iran strategy is that it has no clear endgame. Economic pressure can impose enormous costs on Tehran. But pressure is not a strategy unless there is a plausible mechanism for converting that pain into an acceptable and sustainable political outcome. Iran is unlikely to abandon its core positions simply because sanctions become more severe: control over access through the Strait of Hormuz, its ballistic missile program, and what it considers its right to enrich uranium. Tehran has also spent decades learning how to survive under sanctions. It can adapt, reroute trade, tolerate considerable economic pain and, above all, impose costs of its own. That leaves Washington with an uncomfortable question: What happens if Iran simply refuses to concede? Maintaining the current standoff is hardly cost-free. Hormuz remains severely restricted, U.S. forces must sustain an expensive military presence and blockade, American munitions inventories face additional pressure, and Tehran retains numerous ways to harass U.S. forces and threaten regional shipping. Meanwhile, the economic consequences of disrupted energy flows do not fall on Iran alone. More importantly, Tehran has little incentive to provide Washington with a comfortable, stable status quo. If Iranian leaders eventually conclude that their choice is between accepting American terms that they regard as capitulation and escalating the confrontation, there is every reason to believe they may choose escalation, or at least enough escalation to force Washington to reconsider its position. Avoiding a difficult decision today does not necessarily prevent escalation tomorrow. It may simply postpone the decision while raising its eventual cost. At some point, the administration will have to define what outcome it is actually prepared to accept and what concessions, if any, it is prepared to offer to obtain it. Otherwise Washington risks remaining stuck in an open-ended confrontation: too costly to sustain indefinitely, but without sufficient leverage to compel Iran to accept American terms. The current situation therefore looks less like a durable equilibrium than an intermission. Either diplomacy eventually produces a compromise both sides can live with, or the military confrontation is likely to intensify again. What is difficult to imagine is the present arrangement continuing unchanged for many months. Iran has both the incentive and the means to make sure that it does not. #iran | US President Donald Trump seems to be pursuing a “no war, no peace — just economic pressure” on Iran. Key for that strategy is to get enough oil out of the Strait of Hormuz in ‘dark shuttles’ so prices don’t spiral out of control before the economic pain on Tehran works. Key problem? Iran has demonstrated an incredible capacity to absorb financial pain in the past.

Source:https://x.com/staunovo/status/2087273617511907759