quote: Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. Iran’s economic situation is undoubtedly severe, but economic pressure alone is unlikely to force Tehran either to surrender at the negotiating table or to abandon what it considers core strategic interests, including its ability to contest control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has spent decades operating under intense economic pressure and has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to absorb considerable pain without fundamentally changing course. It could take many months, if ever, for economic conditions to become politically intolerable. And even then, if Tehran believes the choice is between capitulation and escalation, its track record suggests that escalation is the more likely response. That creates a serious problem for Washington. Iran has little incentive to accept a status quo in which it absorbs military and economic costs while the United States pays relatively little in return. Tehran therefore has multiple ways to raise the price: threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, increasing pressure on U.S. forces and partners across the region, and using allied militias and proxies to expand the confrontation. Pressure around Bab el-Mandeb from the Houthis adds another potential point of leverage over regional and global commerce. This is why President Trump may find it difficult to keep the confrontation below the threshold of a broader escalation. Even if Washington wants to contain the crisis and move on to other priorities, Iranian actions could repeatedly force the administration back into it, and eventually confront the president with an uncomfortable choice: accept an outcome Tehran can portray as a victory, or escalate further to impose greater costs. The bottom line is that the current equilibrium is unlikely to hold. Iran is unlikely to accept sustained military pressure without responding, while its economic difficulties, however serious, are unlikely by themselves to produce the concessions Washington wants. The central risk for the United States is therefore not simply whether economic pressure “works.” It is whether Washington has a strategy for what happens when economic pressure fails to produce Iranian capitulation and Tehran instead chooses to escalate. That is the scenario the administration should be preparing for. #iran | 🇺🇸🇮🇷New: President Trump tells me he is "low keying it" on Iran and signals he's prepared to allow economic pressure on Iran to mount. My story on @axios https://www.axios.com/2026/08/09/trump-iran-interview

quote: Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. Iran’s economic situation is undoubtedly severe, but economic pressure alone is unlikely to force Tehran either to surrender at the negotiating table or to abandon what it considers core strategic interests, including its ability to contest control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has spent decades operating under intense economic pressure and has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to absorb considerable pain without fundamentally changing course. It could take many months, if ever, for economic conditions to become politically intolerable. And even then, if Tehran believes the choice is between capitulation and escalation, its track record suggests that escalation is the more likely response. That creates a serious problem for Washington. Iran has little incentive to accept a status quo in which it absorbs military and economic costs while the United States pays relatively little in return. Tehran therefore has multiple ways to raise the price: threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, increasing pressure on U.S. forces and partners across the region, and using allied militias and proxies to expand the confrontation. Pressure around Bab el-Mandeb from the Houthis adds another potential point of leverage over regional and global commerce. This is why President Trump may find it difficult to keep the confrontation below the threshold of a broader escalation. Even if Washington wants to contain the crisis and move on to other priorities, Iranian actions could repeatedly force the administration back into it, and eventually confront the president with an uncomfortable choice: accept an outcome Tehran can portray as a victory, or escalate further to impose greater costs. The bottom line is that the current equilibrium is unlikely to hold. Iran is unlikely to accept sustained military pressure without responding, while its economic difficulties, however serious, are unlikely by themselves to produce the concessions Washington wants. The central risk for the United States is therefore not simply whether economic pressure “works.” It is whether Washington has a strategy for what happens when economic pressure fails to produce Iranian capitulation and Tehran instead chooses to escalate. That is the scenario the administration should be preparing for. #iran | 🇺🇸🇮🇷New: President Trump tells me he is "low keying it" on Iran and signals he's prepared to allow economic pressure on Iran to mount. My story on @axios https://www.axios.com/2026/08/09/trump-iran-interview

Source:https://x.com/staunovo/status/2086514387083301326