quote: Let's assume, for a moment, that Washington accepts Iran's interpretation of Article 5. In practice, that would mean acknowledging Iran's role in controlling maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously lifting the naval blockade imposed on Iran. Would Tehran continue the war because of "internal disagreements"? Almost certainly not. Reducing Iran's behavior to internal political divisions misses the central point. Across Iran's political and security establishment, there is broad consensus that negotiations with the United States, is almost futile given the administration’s behavior. From Tehran's perspective, imposing costs on commercial shipping and the global economy is the primary source of leverage because it demonstrates the price of continuing the confrontation with Iran. There are certainly debates within the Iranian system, but there is little disagreement on the core issues: Iran should not make unilateral concessions to Washington, and it should not abandon what it now considers its rights in the Strait of Hormuz. It is also important to recognize that Iran's internal balance of power has changed because of the war. Since the decapitation of Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has become the dominant force shaping Iran's strategic decision-making, replacing a leader who had traditionally exercised greater restraint over the use of force. This is another result of this war. As long as the United States seeks to restore the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz, continues military strikes against Iran, and maintains a naval blockade, Tehran is unlikely to back down. Conversely, if Washington were to accept Iran's core condition, including its interpretation of the maritime arrangements and the lifting of the blockade—the war would likely end regardless of whatever internal political debates continue inside Iran. Not everything should be explained through the lens of Iran's internal politics. Iran's economic situation is undeniably severe, and the leadership has no interest in fighting a permanent war, as demonstrated by its willingness to support the recent memorandum of understanding. But those realities should not be confused with a willingness to capitulate. Regardless of internal debates, there is broad agreement across Iran's leadership on one fundamental point: Iran cannot afford to retreat or surrender under military pressure. Even those who would prefer to end the conflict understand that making major concessions after months of confrontation would be viewed as a strategic defeat and would only invite more pressure in the future. That is the reality Washington must contend with. Any strategy based on the assumption that economic hardship or internal disagreements alone will compel Tehran to back down is unlikely to succeed. #iran | Officials now believe the IRGC is firmly in control of Iran’s decision making, leaving political figures the US has been talking with as figureheads. Complicating matters are internal dynamics of the IRGC itself, where a handful of senior commanders are all jockeying for control. That is a leading reason why US officials & regional partners fear the conflict is likely to drag on. New reporting w/ @Kevinliptakcnn & @jmhansler https://t.co/BDFblmerb9

quote: Let's assume, for a moment, that Washington accepts Iran's interpretation of Article 5. In practice, that would mean acknowledging Iran's role in controlling maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously lifting the naval blockade imposed on Iran. Would Tehran continue the war because of "internal disagreements"? Almost certainly not. Reducing Iran's behavior to internal political divisions misses the central point. Across Iran's political and security establishment, there is broad consensus that negotiations with the United States, is almost futile given the administration’s behavior. From Tehran's perspective, imposing costs on commercial shipping and the global economy is the primary source of leverage because it demonstrates the price of continuing the confrontation with Iran. There are certainly debates within the Iranian system, but there is little disagreement on the core issues: Iran should not make unilateral concessions to Washington, and it should not abandon what it now considers its rights in the Strait of Hormuz. It is also important to recognize that Iran's internal balance of power has changed because of the war. Since the decapitation of Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has become the dominant force shaping Iran's strategic decision-making, replacing a leader who had traditionally exercised greater restraint over the use of force. This is another result of this war. As long as the United States seeks to restore the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz, continues military strikes against Iran, and maintains a naval blockade, Tehran is unlikely to back down. Conversely, if Washington were to accept Iran's core condition, including its interpretation of the maritime arrangements and the lifting of the blockade—the war would likely end regardless of whatever internal political debates continue inside Iran. Not everything should be explained through the lens of Iran's internal politics. Iran's economic situation is undeniably severe, and the leadership has no interest in fighting a permanent war, as demonstrated by its willingness to support the recent memorandum of understanding. But those realities should not be confused with a willingness to capitulate. Regardless of internal debates, there is broad agreement across Iran's leadership on one fundamental point: Iran cannot afford to retreat or surrender under military pressure. Even those who would prefer to end the conflict understand that making major concessions after months of confrontation would be viewed as a strategic defeat and would only invite more pressure in the future. That is the reality Washington must contend with. Any strategy based on the assumption that economic hardship or internal disagreements alone will compel Tehran to back down is unlikely to succeed. #iran | Officials now believe the IRGC is firmly in control of Iran’s decision making, leaving political figures the US has been talking with as figureheads. Complicating matters are internal dynamics of the IRGC itself, where a handful of senior commanders are all jockeying for control. That is a leading reason why US officials & regional partners fear the conflict is likely to drag on. New reporting w/ @Kevinliptakcnn & @jmhansler https://t.co/BDFblmerb9

Source:https://x.com/staunovo/status/2083440427412099247