The U.S–Iran Deadlock: No Good Options, No Easy Exit, and No Guarantee That Another War Will Work
There are three real | Hanami
The U.S–Iran Deadlock: No Good Options, No Easy Exit, and No Guarantee That Another War Will Work
There are three realities we need to recognize when considering its options toward Iran.
First, there are no good options left, only bad ones with different costs and risks. Operation Roaring Lion failed to achieve its strategic objectives, and we all dealing with the consequences.
Second, insisting on restoring the status quo that existed before February 28 in Hormuz straits will almost certainly prevent meaningful nuclear negotiations.
Third, any agreement will have to give Iran something it can present as a victory. We have to be realistic in that regard.
The biggest obstacle remains Iran's insistence that its seven conditions, particularly the American commitments under the June memorandum of understanding, must be implemented before substantive nuclear negotiations can begin. Tehran is not prepared to accept promises or reverse the sequence. At most, it may agree to shorten the interval between American implementation and the start of nuclear talks.
So what are "other" options?
A. Accept the new reality in Hormuz: Based on the Iran-Oman arrangement, in exchange for an Iranian nuclear declaration and a firm, accelerated timetable for negotiations on nuclear issue
B. Restore the previous situation: Reopen the strait while maintaining sanctions and increasing pressure on China over its purchases of Iranian oil.
C. Pursue a phased interim agreement: Exchange gradual American relief from the blockade for Iranian steps to guarantee freedom of navigation, backed by international guarantees. After completion - nuclear negotiations starts
D. Negotiate a "narrow" nuclear-for-Hormuz deal, meaning recognize Iran's enhanced role in the strait in exchange for concrete, verifiable nuclear commitments.
R. Pursue a broader regional arrangement: Gulf states would provide economic incentives and security arrangements in exchange for reopening the strait, reducing Iranian threats, and restarting nuclear negotiations.
The problem is that nearly all these options collide with Tehran's insistence on the implementation of its seven conditions before nuclear discussions. Washington wants nuclear concessions before surrendering its leverage. Tehran wants American commitments fulfilled before discussing those concessions. That is the heart of the diplomatic deadlock.
I could go on discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each option, but there is one fundamental principle that should guide our strategic thinking.
The Strait of Hormuz is critically important, but there is only one threat Iran could pose to Israel and the gulf states that is truly existential: nuclear weapons.
As long as there is no nuclear agreement, Iran can continue expanding the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear program, making it increasingly difficult for us to determine its actual intentions, capabilities, and how close it may be to crossing the nuclear threshold.
Military pressure can damage Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but it cannot provide the transparency, monitoring, and long-term certainty that a credible nuclear agreement could deliver.
That is why we must distinguish between what is strategically important and what is strategically essential.
Sometimes, in chess as in geopolitics, you have to be willing to sacrifice the queen (Hormuz) to protect the king (the nuclear issue).
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