12/13
3️⃣ Drain the ARB-related vaults in the second exploit transaction
The attacker repeated the same pattern against | Hanami
12/13
3️⃣ Drain the ARB-related vaults in the second exploit transaction
The attacker repeated the same pattern against the ARB call and put vaults.
https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff
Reply to @GoPlusSecurity: 10/13
Most of the 4.4904 WBTC came from the 3.76125 WBTC vault collateral locked in step (1). The attacker also recovered their own deposits. The pool transferred ~0.01125 WBTC to 0x7bf2392b…, consistent with a 0.3% fee.