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V. A recurring problem: weak randomness in 2026
1️⃣ Ill Bloom / legacy CryptoJS weak RNG. Multiple thefts fro | Hanami
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V. A recurring problem: weak randomness in 2026
1️⃣ Ill Bloom / legacy CryptoJS weak RNG. Multiple thefts from May–Aug 2026. Coinspect found some wallets still used CryptoJS’s weak RNG when generating recovery phrases. Confirmed apps: RRWallet, Bexo, NanChat, Bitcoin Libre, Milo. Loss about $5.7M.
coinspect.com/blog/ill-bloom…
2️⃣ Coldcard hardware wallet. On July 30, 2026, weak-entropy seeds from old Coldcard firmware were exploited. 1,816 BTC (~$116M) across 5,200+ addresses.
coldcard.com/security/status
These cases show the same pattern. In the AI era, the barrier to exploiting cryptographic weaknesses — particularly implementation flaws — is falling rapidly. Audits have to cover the real entropy source at seed creation, the platform RNG, and old dependencies. Checking key length, shipping a new client, or locking down custody after generation cannot eliminate the risk of seeds that were already weak.